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On the Eve of Artificial Minds
Chris Eliasmith
I review recent technological, empirical, and theoretical developments related to
building sophisticated cognitive machines. I suggest that rapid growth in robotics,
brain-like computing, new theories of large-scale functional modeling, and finan-
cial resources directed at this goal means that there will soon be a significant in-
crease in the abilities of artificial minds. I propose a specific timeline for this de-
velopment over the next fifty years and argue for its plausibility. I highlight some
barriers to the development of this kind of technology, and discuss the ethical and
philosophical consequences of such a development. I conclude that researchers in
this field, governments, and corporations must take care to be aware of, and will-
ing to discuss, both the costs and benefits of pursuing the construction of artificial
minds. 
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The prediction  game is  a  dangerous  one,  but
that, of course, is what makes it fun. The pit-
falls are many: some technologies change expo-
nentially but some don’t; completely new inven-
tions,  or  fundamental  limits,  might  appear at
any time; and it can be difficult to say some-
thing  informative  without  simply  stating  the
obvious. In short, it’s easy to be wrong if you’re
specific.  (Although,  it  is  easy  to  be  right  if
you’re  Nostradamus.)  Regardless,  the  purpose
of  this  essay is  to play this game. As a con-
sequence, I won’t be pursuing technical discus-
sion on the finer points of what a mind is, or
how  to  build  one,  but  rather  attempting  to
paint  an  abstract  portrait  of  the  state  of  re-
search in fields related to machine intelligence
broadly construed. I think the risks of undertak-
ing this kind of prognostication are justified be-
cause  of  the  enormous  potential  impact  of  a
new kind of technology that lies just around the
corner. It is a technology we have been dream-
ing  about—and  dreading—for  hundreds  of
years. I believe we are on the eve of artificial
minds.
In  1958  Herbert Simon &  Allen Newell
claimed that “there are now in the world ma-
chines that think” and predicted that it would
take ten years for a computer to become world
chess  champion  and  write  beautiful  music
(1958,  p.  8).  Becoming world  chess  champion
took longer,  and we still  don’t  have a digital
Debussy. More importantly, even when a com-
puter became world chess champion it was not
generally seen  as the success  that  Simon and
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Newell had expected. This is because the way in
which Deep Blue beat Gary Kasparov did not
strike many as advancing our understanding of
cognition.  Instead,  it  showed that  brute  force
computation, and a lot of careful tweaking by
expert chess players, could surpass human per-
formance in a specific, highly circumscribed en-
vironment.
Excitement  about  AI  grew again  in  the
1980s,  but  was  followed  by  funding  cuts  and
general  skepticism  in  the  “AI  winter”  of  the
1990s (Newquist 1994). Maybe we are just stuck
in a thirty-year cycle of excitement followed by
disappointment, and I am simply expressing the
beginning of the next temporary uptick. How-
ever, I don’t think this is the case. Instead, I
believe  that  there  are  qualitative  changes  in
methods,  computational  platforms,  and  finan-
cial  resources  that  place  us  in  a  historically
unique  position  to  develop  artificial  minds.  I
will discuss each of these in more detail in sub-
sequent sections, but here is a brief overview.
Statistical  and brain-like modeling meth-
ods are far more mature than they have ever
been before. Systems with millions (Garis et al.
2010;  Eliasmith et al. 2012) and even tens of
millions  (Fox 2009)  of  simulated  neurons  are
suddenly  becoming common,  and the  scale  of
models is increasing at a rapid rate. In addition,
the  challenges  of  controlling  a  sophisticated,
nonlinear  body  are  being  met  by  recent  ad-
vances in robotics (Cheah et al. 2006; Schaal et
al. 2007).  These  kinds  of  methodological  ad-
vances represent  a significant  shift  away from
classical approaches to AI (which were largely
responsible for the previously unfullfilled prom-
ises of AI) to more neurally inspired, and brain-
like ones. I believe this change in focus will al-
low us to succeed where we haven’t before. In
short, the conceptual tools and technical meth-
ods  being  developed  for  studying  what  I  call
“biological  cognition”  (Eliasmith 2013),  will
make a fundamental difference to our likelihood
of success.
Second, there have been closely allied and
important  advances  in  the  kinds  of  computa-
tional platforms that can be exploited to run
these  models.  So-called  “neuromorphic”  com-
puting—hardware platforms that perform brain-
style computation—has been rapidly scaling up,
with  several  current  projects  expected  to  hit
millions  (Choudhary et  al. 2012)  and  billions
(Khan et al. 2008) of neurons running in real
time within the next three to four years. These
hardware  advances  are  critical  for  performing
efficient computation capable of realizing brain-
like  functions  embedded  in  and  controlling
physical, robotic bodies.
Finally,  unprecedented financial  resources
have been allocated by both public and private
groups focusing on basic science and industrial
applications. For instance, in February 2013 the
European Union announced one billion euros in
funding for the Human Brain Project, which fo-
cuses on developing a large scale brain model as
well as neuromorphic and robotic platforms. A
month later, the Obama BRAIN initiative was
announced in the United States. This initiative
devotes  the  same  level  of  funding  to  experi-
mental, technological, and theoretical advances
in neuroscience. More recently, there has been a
huge amount of private investment:
Google  purchased  eight  robotics  and  AI
companies between Dec 2013 and Jan 2014, in-
cluding industry leader Boston Dynamics Stunt
(2014).
Qualcomm has introduced the Zeroth pro-
cessor,  which  is  modeled  after  how  a  human
brain works (Kumar 2013). They demonstrated
an  Field-Programmable  Gate  Array  (FPGA)
mock-up of the chip performing a reinforcement
learning task on a robot.
Amazon has recently expressed a desire to
provide the Amazon Prime Air service,  which
will  use  robotic  quadcopters  to  deliver  goods
within  thirty  minutes  of  their  having  been
ordered (Amazon 2013).
IBM has launched a product based on Wat-
son, which famously beat the best human Jeop-
ardy players (http://ibm.com/innovation/us/wats
on/). The product will provide confidence based
responses to natural language queries. It has been
opened up to allow developers to use it in a wide
variety of applications. They are also developing a
neuromorphic platform (Esser et al. 2013).
In addition, there are a growing number of
startups that work on brain-inspired computing
including Numenta, the Brain Corporation, Vi-
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carious,  DeepMind  (recently  purchased  by
Google for $400 million) and Applied Brain Re-
search, among many others. In short, I believe
there  are  more  dollars  being  directed  at  the
problem than ever before.
It is primarily these three forces that I be-
lieve will allow us to build convincing examples
of artificial minds in the next fifty years. And, I
believe we can do this without necessarily defin-
ing what it is that makes a “mind”—even an ar-
tificial  one.  As  with  many  subtle  concepts—
such as “game,” to use Wittgenstein’s example,
or “pornography,” to use Supreme Court Justice
Potter  Stewart’s  example—I  suspect  we  will
avoid definitions and rely instead on our soph-
isticated,  but  poorly  understood,  methods  of
classifying the world around us. In the case of
“minds,” these methods will be partly behavi-
oural,  partly  theoretical,  and partly  based  on
judgments of similarity to the familiar. In any
case, I do not propose to provide a definition
here, but rather to point to reasons why the ar-
tifacts we continue to build will become more
and more like the natural minds around us. In
doing so, I survey recent technological, theoret-
ical,  and empirical  developments that  are im-
portant  for  supporting  our  progress  on  this
front. I then suggest a timeline over which I ex-
pect these developments to take place. Finally, I
conclude with what I expect to be the major
philosophical and societal impacts on our being
able to build artificial minds. As a reminder, I
am adopting a somewhat high-level perspective
on the behavioural sciences and related techno-
logies in order to make clear where my broad
(and likely wrong) predictions are coming from.
In addition, if I’m not entirely wrong, I suspect
that the practical implications of such develop-
ments will  prove salient  to a broad audience,
and so,  as  researchers  in the area,  we should
consider the consequences of our research.
2 Technological developments
Because I take it that brain-based approaches
provide the “difference that makes a difference”
between current approaches and traditional AI,
here I focus on developments in neuromorphic
and robotic technology. Notably, all of the de-
velopments  in  neuromorphic  hardware  that  I
discuss  below are inspired by some basic  fea-
tures of neural computation. For instance, all of
the neuromorphic approaches use spiking neural
networks SNNs to encode and process informa-
tion. In addition, there is unanimous agreement
that biological computation is in orders of mag-
nitude more power efficient than digital compu-
tation (Hasler &  Marr 2013).  Consequently,  a
central motivation behind exploring these hard-
ware technologies is that they might allow for
sophisticated information processing using small
amounts of power. This is critical for applica-
tions that require the processing to be near the
data, such as in robotics and remote sensing. In
what follows I begin by providing a sample of
several major projects in neuromorphic comput-
ing that span the space of current work in the
area. I then briefly discuss the current state of
high-performance  computing  and  robotics,  to
identify the roles of the most relevant technolo-
gies for developing artificial minds.
To  complement  its  cognitively  focused
Watson  project,  IBM  has  been  developing  a
neuromorphic  architecture,  a  digital  model  of
individual neurons, and a method for program-
ming this architecture (Esser et al. 2013). The
architecture itself is called TrueNorth. They ar-
gue that the “low-precision, synthetic, simultan-
eous, pattern-based metaphor of TrueNorth is a
fitting complement to the high-precision,  ana-
lytical,  sequential,  logic-based  metaphor  of
today’s of von Neumann computers” (Esser et
al. 2013, p. 1). TrueNorth has neurons organ-
ized  into  256  neuron  blocks,  in  which  each
neuron can receive input from 256 axons. To as-
sist with programming this hardware, IBM has
introduced the notion of a “corelet,” which is an
abstraction that encapsulates local connectivity
in  small  networks.  These  act  like  small  pro-
grams that can be composed in order to build
up more complex functions. To date the demon-
strations  of  the  approach  have  focused  on
simple,  largely  feed-forward,  standard applica-
tions, though across a wide range of methods,
including  Restricted  Boltzmann  Machines
(RBMs), liquid state machines, Hidden Markov
Model (HMMs), and so on. It should be noted
that the proposed chip does not yet exist, and
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current demonstrations are on detailed simula-
tions of the architecture. However, because it is
a digital chip the simulations are highly accur-
ate.
A direct competitor to IBM’s approach is
the Zeroth neuromorphic chip from Qualcomm.
Like IBM, Qualcomm believes that constructing
brain-inspired  hardware  will  provide  a  new
paradigm for exploiting the efficiencies of neural
computation, targeted at the kind of informa-
tion processing at which brains excel, but which
is extremely challenging for von Neumann ap-
proaches.  The  main  difference  between  these
two approaches is that Qualcomm has commit-
ted to allowing online learning to take place on
the  hardware.  Consequently,  they  announced
their processor by demonstrating its application
in a reinforcement learning paradigm on a real-
world robot. They have released videos of the
robot  maneuvering  in  an  environment  and
learning  to  only  visit  one  kind  of  stimulus
(white boxes:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=8c1Noq2K96c). It should again be noted that
this  is  an FPGA simulation of  a  digital  chip
that  does not  yet  exist.  However,  the simula-
tion, like IBM’s, is highly accurate.
In  the  academic  sphere,  the  Spinnaker
project at Manchester University has not fo-
cused on designing new kinds of chips, but has
instead focused on using low-power ARM pro-
cessors on a massive scale to allow large-scale
brain simulations (Khan et al. 2008). As a res-
ult,  the  focus  has  been  on  designing  ap-
proaches  to  routing  that  allow  for  the  high
bandwidth communication, which underwrites
much  of  the  brain’s  information  processing.
Simulations on the Spinnaker hardware typic-
ally  employ  spiking  neurons,  like  IBM  and
Qualcomm, and occasionally allow for learning
(Davies et al. 2013), as with Qualcomm’s ap-
proach. However, even with low power conven-
tional chips, the energy usage is projected to
be  higher  on  the  Spinnaker  platform  per
neuron.  Nevertheless,  Spinnaker  boards  have
been  used  in  a  wider  variety  of  larger-scale
embodied  and  non-embodied  applications.
These include simulating place cells, path in-
tegration,  simple  sensory-guided  movements,
and item classification.
There are also a number of neuromorphic
projects that use analog instead of digital im-
plementations  of  neurons.  Analog  approaches
tend  to  be  several  orders  of  magnitude more
power efficient  (Hasler &  Marr 2013),  though
also more noisy, unreliable, and subject to pro-
cess variation (i.e.,  variations in the hardware
due to variability in the size of components on
the manufactured chip). These projects include
work on the Neurogrid chip at Stanford Univer-
sity (Choudhary et al. 2012), and on a chip at
ETH  Zürich  (Corradi,  Eliasmith &  Indiveri
2014).  The  Neurogrid  chip  has  demonstrated
larger numbers of simulated neurons—up to a
million—while the ETH Zürich chip allows for
online  learning.  More  recently,  the  Neurogrid
chip has been used to control a nonlinear, six
degree of freedom robotic arm, exhibiting per-
haps  the  most  sophisticated  information  pro-
cessing from an analog chip to date.
In  addition  to  the  above  neuromorphic
projects, which are focused on cortical simula-
tion, there have been several specialized neur-
omorphic chips that mimic the information pro-
cessing of different perceptual systems. For ex-
ample, the dynamic vision sensor (DVS) artifi-
cial  retina developed at ETH Zürich performs
real-time  vision  processing  that  results  in  a
stream of neuron-like spikes (Lichtsteiner et al.
2008).  Similarly,  an  artificial  cochlea  called
AEREAR2 has been developed that generates
spikes in response to auditory signals (Li et al.
2012).  The  development  of  these  and  other
neuronal sensors makes it possible to build fully
embodied  spiking  neuromorphic  systems (Gal-
luppi et al. 2014).
There have also been developments in tra-
ditional computing platforms that are import-
ant for supporting the construction of  models
that  run  on  neuromorphic  hardware.  Testing
and debugging large-scale neural models is often
much  easier  with  traditional  computational
platforms  such  as  Graphics  Processing  Unit
(GPUs)  and supercomputers.  In  addition,  the
development  of  neuromorphic  hardware  often
relies on simulation of the designs before manu-
facture.  For  example,  IBM  has  been  testing
their  TrueNorth  architecture  with  very  large-
scale simulations that have run up to 500 billion
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neurons.  These  kinds  of  simulations  allow for
designs to be stress-tested and fine-tuned before
costly production is undertaken.  In short,  the
development of traditional hardware is also an
important technological advance that supports
the  rapid  development  of  more  biologically-
based approaches to constructing artificial cog-
nitive systems.
A third area of rapid technological devel-
opment that is critical for successfully realizing
artificial minds is the field of robotics. The suc-
cess of recent methods in robotics have entered
public  awareness  with  the  creation  of  the
Google car. This self-driving vehicle has success-
fully navigated hundreds of thousands of miles
of urban and rural roadways. Many of the tech-
nologies  in  the  car  were  developed  out  of
DARPA’s  Grand  Challenge  to  build  an
autonomous  vehicle  that  would  be  tested  in
both urban and rural settings. Due to the suc-
cess of the first three iterations of the Grand
Challenge, DARPA is now funding a challenge
to build robots that can be deployed in emer-
gency situations, such as a nuclear meltdown or
other disaster.
One of the most impressive humanoid ro-
bots to be built for this challenge is the Atlas,
constructed by Boston Dynamics. It has twenty-
eight degrees of freedom, covering two arms, two
legs, a torso, and a head. The robot has been
demonstrated  walking  bipedally,  even  in  ex-
tremely  challenging  environments  in  which  it
must use its hands to help navigate and steady it-
self  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zkBn-
FPBV3f0).  Several  teams  in  this  most  recent
Grand Challenge have been awarded a copy of
Atlas, and have been proceeding to competitively
design algorithms to improve its performance.
In fact, there have been a wide variety of
significant  advances  in  robotic  control  al-
gorithms,  enabling  robots—including  quad-
copters,  wheeled  platforms,  and humanoid ro-
bots—to  perform  tasks  more  accurately  and
more quickly than had previously been possible.
This  has  resulted  in  one  of  the  first  human
versus  robot  dexterity  competitions  being  re-
cently announced. Just as IBM pitted Watson
against human Jeopardy champions, Kuka has
pitted  its  high-speed  arm against  the  human
ping-pong champion Timo Boll (http://www.y-
outube.com/watch?v=_mbdtupCbc4).  Despite
the somewhat disappointing outcome, this kind
of  competition  would  not  have  been  thought
possible a mere five years ago (Ackerman 2014).
These three areas of technological develop-
ment—neuromorphics,  high-performance  con-
ventional  computing,  and  robotics—are  pro-
gressing at an incredibly rapid pace. And, more
importantly, their convergence will allow a new
class  of  artificial  agents  to  be  built.  That  is,
agents that can begin processing information at
very  similar  speeds  and  support  very  similar
skills to those we observe in the animal king-
dom. It is perhaps important to emphasize that
my purpose here is predictive. I am not claim-
ing that current technologies are sufficient for
building  a  new  kind  of  artificial  mind,  but
rather that they lay the foundations,  and are
progressing at a sufficient rate to make it reas-
onable to expect that the sophistication, adapt-
ability,  flexibility,  and  robustness  of  artificial
minds will rapidly approach those of the human
mind. We might again worry that it will be dif-
ficult  to  measure  such  progress,  but  I  would
suggest that progress will be made along many
dimensions  simultaneously,  so  picking  nearly
any of dimensions will result in some measur-
able improvement. In general, multi-dimensional
similarity judgements are likely to result in “I’ll
know it when I see it” kinds of reactions to clas-
sifying complicated examples. This may be de-
rided  by  some  as  “hand-wavy”,  but  it  might
also  be  a  simple  acknowledgement  that
“mindedness”  is  complex.  I  would  like  to  be
clear that my claims about approaching human
mindful behaviour are to be taken as applying
to the vast majority of the many measures we
use for identifying minds.
3 Theoretical developments
Along  with  these  technological  developments
there have been a series of theoretical develop-
ments that are critical for building large-scale
artificial agents. Some have argued that theoret-
ical developments are not that important: sug-
gesting  that  standard  back  propagation  at  a
sufficiently  large  scale  is  enough  to  capture
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complex  perceptual  processing  (Krizhevsky et
al. 2012). That is, building brain-like models is
more  a  matter  of  getting  a  sufficiently  large
computer with enough parameters and neurons
than  it  is  of  discovering  some new principles
about how brains function. If this is true, then
the technological developments that I pointed to
in  the  previous  section  may  be  sufficient  for
scaling to sophisticated cognitive agents. How-
ever, I am not convinced that this is the case.
As a result, I think that theoretical devel-
opments  in  deep  learning,  nonlinear  adaptive
control, high dimensional brain-like computing,
and biological  cognition  combined will  be  im-
portant  to support  continued advances in  un-
derstanding how the mind works. For instance,
deep networks continue to achieve state-of-the-
art results in a wide variety of perception-like
processing  challenges  (http://rodrigob.git-
hub.io/are_we_there_yet/build/classification_
datasets_results.html#43494641522d3130). And
while  deep  networks  have  traditionally  been
used  for  static  processing,  such  as  an  image
classification  or  document  classification,  there
has been a recent, concerted move to use them
to model more dynamic perceptual tasks as well
(Graves et al. 2013). In essence, deep networks
are  one  among many techniques for  modeling
the  statistics  of  time  varying  signals,  a  skill
central to animal cognition.
However, animals are also incredibly ad-
ept  at  control ling nonlinear  dynamical  sys-
tems,  including  their  bodies.  That  is,  biolo-
gical brains can  generate time varying signals
that allow successful and sophisticated inter-
actions with their environment through their
body. Critically, there have been a variety of
important  theoretical  advances  in  nonlinear
and  adaptive  control  theory  as  well.  New
methods  for  solving  difficult  optimal  control
problems have been discovered through careful
study of biological motor control (Schaal et al.
2007; Todorov 2008). In addition, advances in
hierarchical control allow for real-time compu-
tation of difficult inverse kinematics problems
on a laptop (Khatib 1987).  And, finally,  im-
portant advances in adaptive control allow for
the automatic learning of both kinematic and
dynamic models even in highly nonlinear and
high dimensional control spaces (Cheah et al.
2006).
Concurrently  with  these  more  abstract
characterizations  of  brain  function  there  have
been  theoretical  developments  in  neuroscience
that have deepened our understanding of how
biological neural networks may perform sophist-
icated information processing. Work using the
Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) has res-
ulted in a wide variety of spiking neural models
that mirror data recorded from biological sys-
tems (Eliasmith & Anderson 1999, 2003). In ad-
dition,  the  closely  related  liquid  computing
(Maass et  al. 2002)  and  FORCE  learning
(Sussillo &  Abbott 2009) paradigms have been
successfully exploited by a number of research-
ers  to  generate  interesting  dynamical  systems
that  often  closely  mirror  biological  data.  To-
gether these kinds of methods provide quantit-
ative  characterizations  of  the  computational
power available in biologically plausible neural
networks. Such developments are crucial for ex-
ploiting  neuromorphic  approaches  to  building
brain-like hardware. And they suggest ways of
testing  some  of  the  more  abstract  perceptual
and control ideas in real-world, brain-like imple-
mentations.
Interestingly, several authors have suggested
that difficult perceptual and control problems are
in fact mathematical duals of one another (To-
dorov 2009;  Eliasmith 2013).  This  means  that
there  are  deep  theoretical  connections  between
perception  and  motor  control.  This  realization
points to a need to think hard about how diverse
aspects of brain function can be integrated into
single, large-scale models. This has been a major
focus of research in my lab recently. One result of
this focus is Spaun, currently the world’s largest
functional brain model. This model incorporates
deep networks, recent control methods, and the
NEF to perform eight different perceptual, motor,
and cognitive tasks (Eliasmith et al. 2012). Im-
portantly, this is not a one-off model, but rather a
single example among many that employs a gen-
eral architecture intended to directly address in-
tegrated  biological  cognition  (Eliasmith 2013).
Currently,  the  most  challenging  constraints  for
running  models  like  Spaun  are  technological—
computers  are  not  fast  enough.  However,  the
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neuromorphic technologies  mentioned previously
should soon remove these constraints. So, in some
sense, theory currently outstrips application: we
have individually tested several critical assump-
tions of the model and shown that they scale well
(Crawford et al. 2013), but we are not yet able to
integrate full-scale versions of the components due
to limitations in current computational resources.
Taken together, I believe that these recent
theoretical  developments  demonstrate  that  we
have a roadmap for how to approach the prob-
lem of  building sophisticated models  of  biolo-
gical cognition. No doubt not all of the methods
we need are currently available,  but  it  is  not
evident  that  there  are  any  major  conceptual
roadblocks to building a cognitive system that
rivals  the  flexibility,  adaptability,  and  robust-
ness of those found in nature. I believe this is a
unique historical position. In the heyday of the
symbolic approach to AI there were detractors
who said that the perceptual problems solved
easily  by biological  systems  would  be  a  chal-
lenge for the symbolic approach (Norman 1986;
Rumelhart 1989).  They  were  correct.  In  the
heyday of connectionism there were detractors
who said that standard approaches to artificial
neural networks would not be able to solve diffi-
cult planning or syntactic processing problems
(Pinker & Prince 1988; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988;
Jackendoff 2002).  They  were  correct.  In  the
heyday  of  statistical  machine  learning  ap-
proaches (a heyday we are still in) there are de-
tractors who say that mountains of data are not
sufficient for solving the kinds of problems faced
by biological cognitive systems (Marcus 2013).
They are probably correct. However, as many of
the  insights  of  these  various  approaches  are
combined  with  control  theory,  integrated  into
models  able  to  do  efficient  syntactic  and  se-
mantic processing with neural networks, and, in
general, become conceptually unified (Eliasmith
2013), it is less and less obvious what might be
missing from our characterization of biological
cognition.
4 Empirical developments
One  thing  that  might  be  missing  is,  simply,
knowledge. We have many questions about how
real  biological  systems  work  that  remain  un-
answered.  Of  course,  complete  knowledge  of
natural systems is not a prerequisite for build-
ing nearly functionally equivalent systems (see
e.g., flight). However, I believe our understand-
ing of natural cognitive systems will continue to
play an important role in deciding what kinds
of  algorithms are worth pursuing as we build
more sophisticated artificial agents.
Fortunately, on this front there have been
two announcements of significant resources ded-
icated to improving our knowledge of the brain,
which I mentioned in the introduction. One is
from the EU and the other from the US. Each
are investing over $1 billion in generating the
kind of data needed to fill gaps in our under-
standing of how brains function. The EU’s Hu-
man Brain Project (HBP) includes two central
subprojects aimed at gathering mouse and hu-
man brain data to complement the large-scale
models  being  built  within  the  project.  These
subprojects will focus on genetic, cellular, vas-
cular, and overall  organizational data to com-
plement  the  large-scale  projects  of  this  type
already available (such as the Allen Brain Atlas,
http://www.brain-map.org/).  One  central  goal
of these subprojects is to clarify the relationship
between the mouse (which is highly experiment-
ally accessible) and human subjects.
The American “brain research through ad-
vancing  innovative  neurotechnologies”  (BRAIN)
initiative is even more directly focused on large-
scale gathering of neural data. Its purpose is to
accelerate technologies to provide large-scale dy-
namic information about the brain that demon-
strates how both single runs and larger neural cir-
cuits operate.  Its explicit  goal is  to “fill  major
gaps in our current knowledge” (http://www.ni-
h.gov/science/brain/). It is a natural complement
to  the  human  connectome  project,  which  has
been mapping the structure of the human brain
on  a  large-scale  (http://www.humanconnec-
tomeproject.org/). Even though it is not yet clear
exactly what information will be provided by the
BRAIN intiative,  it is  clear that significant re-
sources are being put into developing technologies
that draw on nanoscience, informatics, engineer-
ing, and other fields to measure the brain at a
level of detail and scale not previously possible.
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While both of these projects are just over a
year old, they have both garnered international
attention and been rewarded with sufficient fund-
ing to ensure a good measure of success.  Con-
sequently, it is likely that as we build more soph-
isticated models of brain function, and as we dis-
cover where our greatest areas of ignorance lay,
we will be able to turn to the methods developed
by these projects to rapidly gain critical informa-
tion and continue improving our models. In short,
I believe that there is a confluence of technolo-
gical,  theoretical,  and  empirical  developments
that will  allow for bootstrapping detailed func-
tional models of the brain. It is precisely these
kinds of models that I expect will  lead to the
most convincing embodiments of artificial cogni-
tion that we have ever seen—I am even willing to
suggest that their sophistication will rival those of
natural cognitive systems.
5 A future timeline 
Until this point I have been mustering evidence
that there will soon be significant improvements
in  our  ability  to  construct  artificial  cognitive
agents. However, I have not been very specific
about timing. The purpose of this section is to
provide more quantification on the speed of de-
velopment in the field.
In Table  1, the first column specifies the
timeframe, the second suggests the number of
neurons that will be simulatable in real-time on
standard hardware, the third suggests the num-
ber of neurons that will be simulatable in real-
time on neuromorphic hardware,  and the last
identifies relevant achievable behaviours within
that timeframe.
I believe that several of the computational
technologies I have mentioned, as well as empir-
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ical methods for gathering evidence, are on an
exponential  trajectory  by  relevant  measures
(e.g.,  number of  neurons per  chip,  number of
neurons recorded  Stevenson &  Kording 2011).
On the technological side, if we assume a doub-
ling every eighteen months, this is equivalent to
an  increase  of  about  one  order  of  magnitude
every five years. I should also note that I am as-
suming that real-time simulation of neurons will
be embedded in an interactive, real-world envir-
onment, and that the neuron count is for the
whole system (not a single chip). For context, it
is worth remembering that the human brain has
about 1011 neurons, though they are more com-
putationally sophisticated than those typically
simulated in hardware.
Another  caveat  is  that  it  is  likely  that
large-scale  simulations  on  a  digital  Von  Neu-
mann  architecture  will  hit  a  power  barrier,
which makes it likely that the suggested scaling
could be achieved, but will be cost-prohibitive
in fifty years. Consequently, a neuromorphic al-
ternative is most likely to be the standard im-
plementational substrate of artificial agents.
Finally, the behavioural characterizations I
am giving are with a view to functions neces-
sary for creating a convincing artificial mind in
an artificial body. Consequently, my comments
generally address perceptual, motor, and cognit-
ive  skills  relevant  to  reproducing  human-like
abilities.
6 Consequences for philosophy
So suppose that, fifty years hence, we have de-
veloped an understanding of cognitive systems
that allows us to build artificial  systems that
are on par with, or, if we see fit, surpass the
abilities of an average person. Suppose, that is,
that  we  can  build  artificial  agents  that  can
move, react, adapt, and think much like human
beings. What consequences,  if  any, would this
have for our theoretical questions about cogni-
tion? I take these questions to largely be in the
domain of philosophy of mind. In this section I
consider several central issues in philosophy of
mind and discuss what sorts of consequences I
take  building  a  human-like  artificial  agent  to
have for them.
Being a philosopher, I am certain that, for
any contemporary problem we consider, at least
some  subset  of  those  who  have  a  committed
opinion about that problem will not admit that
any amount of technical advance can “solve” it.
I suspect, however, that their opinions may end
up carrying about as much weight as a modern-
day vitalist. To take one easy example, let us
think for a moment about contemporary dual-
ism. Some contemporary dualists hold that even
if we had a complete understanding of how the
brain functions, we would be no closer to solv-
ing  the  “hard  problem”  of  consciousness
(Chalmers 1996).  The  “hard  problem”  is  the
problem of explaining how subjective experience
comes  from neural  activity.  That  is,  how the
phenomenal experiences we know from a first-
person  perspective  can  be  accounted  for  by
third-person  physicalist  approaches  to  under-
standing the mind. If indeed we have construc-
ted  artificial  agents  that  behave  much  like
people,  share a wide variety of internal states
with people, are fully empirically accessible, and
report experiences like people, it is not obvious
to what extent this problem will not have been
solved. Philosophers who are committed to the
notion that no amount of empirical knowledge
will  solve  the  problem  will  of  course  dismiss
such an accomplishment on the strength of their
intuitions. I suspect, however, that when most
people  are  actually  confronted  with  such  an
agent—one they can interrogate to their heart’s
content  and  one  about  which  they  can  have
complete knowledge  of  its  functioning—it  will
seem odd indeed to suppose that we cannot ex-
plain how its subjective experience is generated.
I  suspect  it  will  seem  as  odd  as  someone
nowadays claiming that we cannot expect to ex-
plain how life is generated despite our current
understanding of biochemistry. Another way to
put this is that the “strong intuitions” of con-
temporary dualists will hold little plausibility in
the face of actually existing, convincing artificial
agents, and so, I suspect, they will become even
more of a rarity.
I refer to this example as “easy” because
the  central  reasons  for  rejecting  dualism  are
only strengthened, not  generated, by the exist-
ence of sophisticated artificial  minds. That is,
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good  arguments  against  the  dualist  view  are
more or less independent of the current state of
constructing agents (although the existence of
such  agents  will  likely  sway intuitions).  How-
ever,  other  philosophical  conundrums,  like
Searle’s famous Chinese room (1980), have re-
sponses  that  depend  fairly  explicitly  on  our
ability to construct artificial agents. In particu-
lar,  the “systems reply” suggests that a suffi-
ciently complex system will have the same in-
tentional states as a biological cognitive system.
For those who think that this is a good rejec-
tion of Searle’s strong intentionalist views, hav-
ing systems that meet all the requirements of
their  currently  hypothetical  agents  would
provide  strong  empirical  evidence  consistent
with their position. Of course, the existence of
such  artificial  agents  is  unlikely  to  convince
those,  like  Searle,  who  believe  that  there  is
some fundamental property of biology that al-
lows  intentionality  to  gain  a  foothold.  But  it
does make such a position seem that much more
tenuous if every means of measuring intentional-
ity produces similar measurements across non-
biological and biological agents. In any case, the
realization of the systems reply does ultimately
depend on our ability to construct sufficiently
sophisticated  artificial  agents.  And  I  am sug-
gesting that such agents are likely to be avail-
able in the next fifty years.
More  immediately,  I  suspect  we  will  be
able  to  make  significant  headway  on  several
problems  that  have  been  traditionally  con-
sidered philosophical  before we reach the fifty-
year mark. For example, the frame problem—
i.e.,  the problem of  knowing what representa-
tional states to update in a dynamic environ-
ment—is one that contemporary methods, like
control  theory  and  machine  learning,  struggle
with much less than classical methods. Because
the dynamics of the environment are explicitly
included in the world-model being exploited by
such control theoretic and statistical methods,
updating  state  representations  naturally  in-
cludes  the  kinds  of  expectations  that  caused
such problems for symbolic approaches.
Similarly,  explicit  quantitative  solutions
are suggested for the symbol-grounding problem
through integrated models that incorporate as-
pects  of  both statistical  perceptual  processing
and  syntactic  manipulation.  Even  in  simple
models, like Spaun, it is clear how the symbols
for digits that are syntactically manipulated are
related  to  inputs  coming  from  the  external
world  (Eliasmith 2013).  And  it  is  clear  how
those same symbols can play a role in driving
the  model’s  body  to  express  its  knowledge
about  those  representations.  As  a  result,  the
tasks  that  Spaun  can  undertake  demonstrate
both  conceptual  knowledge,  through the  sym-
bol-like relationships between numbers (e.g., in
the counting task),  and perceptual knowledge,
through categorization and the ability to drive
its motor system to reproduce visual properties
(e.g., in the copy-drawing task).
In some cases, rather than resolving philo-
sophical debates, the advent of sophisticated ar-
tificial agents is likely to make these debates far
more  empirically  grounded.  These  include  de-
bates about the nature of concepts, conceptual
change, and functionalism, among others. How-
ever these debates turn out, it seems clear that
having an engineered, working system that can
generate behaviour as sophisticated as that that
gave rise to these theoretical ideas in the first
place  will  allow  a  systematic  investigation  of
their  appropriate  application.  After  all,  there
are few, if any, limits on the empirical informa-
tion we can garner from such constructed sys-
tems. In addition, our having built the system
explicitly makes it  unlikely that  we would be
unaware of some “critical element” essential in
generating the observed behaviours.
Even without such a working system, I be-
lieve  that  there  are  already  hints  as  to  how
these debates are likely to be resolved, given the
theoretical approaches I highlighted earlier. For
instance, I suspect that we will find that con-
cepts are explained by a combination of vector
space representations and a restricted class of
dynamic  processes  defined  over  those  spaces
(Eliasmith 2013). Similarly, quantifying the ad-
aptive nature of those representations and pro-
cesses will indicate the nature of mechanisms of
conceptual  change  in  individuals  (Thagard
2014). In addition, functionalism will probably
seem too crude a hypothesis  given  a  detailed
understanding of how to build a wide variety of
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artificial minds. Perhaps a kind of “functional-
ism with error bars” will take its place, provid-
ing a useful means of talking about degrees of
functional similarity and allowing a quantifica-
tion of functional characterizations of complex
systems. Consequently, suggestions about which
functions are or are not necessary for “minded-
ness” can be empirically tested through explicit
implementation and experimentation. This will
not solve the problem of mapping experimental
results to conceptual claims (a problem we cur-
rently  face  when  considering  non-human  and
even some human subjects),  but  it  will  make
functionalism as empirically accessible as seems
plausible.
In  addition  to  these  philosophical  issues
that may undergo reconceptualization with the
construction of artificial minds, there are others
that are bound to become more vexing. For ex-
ample, the breadth of application of ethical the-
ory may, for the first time, reach to engineered
devices.  If,  after  all,  we  have  built  artificial
minds capable of understanding their place in
the  universe,  it  seems  likely  we  will  have  to
worry  about  the  possibility  of  their  suffering
(Metzinger 2013). It does not seem that under-
standing how such devices work, or having ex-
plicitly built them, will be sufficient for dismiss-
ing them as having no moral status. While cur-
rent theories of non-human ethics have been de-
veloped, it is not clear how much or little theor-
ies of non-biological ethics will be able to bor-
row from them.
I suspect that the complexities introduced
to ethical theory will go beyond adding a new
category of potential application. Because artifi-
cial  minds will  be designed,  they may be de-
signed  to  make  what  have  traditionally  been
morally  objectionable  inter-mind  relationships
seem less problematic. Consider, for instance, a
robot that is designed to gain maximal self-ful-
fillment out of providing service to people. That
is, unlike any biological species of which we are
aware,  these  robots  place  service  to  humans
above  all  else.  Is  a  slave-like  relationship
between humans and these minds still wrong in
such an instance? Whatever our analysis of why
slavery is wrong, it seems likely that we will be
able to design artificial minds that bypass that
analysis.  This  is  a  unique  quandary  because
while  it  is  currently  possible  for  certain indi-
viduals  to  claim  to  have  such  slave-aligned
goals, it is always possible to argue that they
are simply mistaken in their personal psycholo-
gical analysis. In the case of minds whose psy-
chology is designed in a known manner, how-
ever, the having of such goals will at least seem
much  more  genuine.  This  is  only  one  among
many new kinds of challenges that ethical the-
ory will face with the development of sophistic-
ated artificial agents (Metzinger 2013).
I  do  not  take  this  surely  unreasonably
brief discussion of any of these subtle philosoph-
ical issues to do justice to them. My main pur-
pose here is to provide a few example instances
of how the technological developments discussed
earlier  are  likely  to  affect  our  theoretical  in-
quiry.  On  some  occasions  such  developments
will lead to strengthening already common intu-
itions; on others they may provide deep empir-
ical access to closely related issues; and on still
other occasions these developments will serve to
make complex issues even more so.
7 The good and the bad
As with the development of many technologies
—cars, electricity, nuclear power—the construc-
tion of  artificial  minds  is  likely  to  have both
negative and positive impacts. However, there is
a sense in which building  minds is much more
fraught than these other technologies. We may,
after all, build agents that are themselves cap-
able of immorality. Presumably we would much
prefer to build Commander Data than to build
HAL or the Terminator. But how to do this is
by no means obvious. There have been several
interesting suggestions as to how this might be
accomplished, perhaps most notably from Isaac
Asimov in his entertaining and thought-provok-
ing exploration of the three laws of robotics. For
my purposes, however, I will sidestep this issue
—not because it is not important, but because
more immediate concerns arise from considering
the development of these agents from a techno-
logical  perspective.  Let me then focus on the
more immediately pressing consequences of con-
structing intelligent machines.
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The rapid development of technologies re-
lated  to artificial  intelligence  has  not  escaped
the  notice  of  governments  around  the  world.
One of the primary concerns for governments is
the potentially massive changes in the nature of
the economy that may result from an increase
in automatization. It has recently been sugges-
ted that almost half of the jobs in the United
States are likely to be computerized in the next
twenty years (Rutkin 2013). The US Bureau of
Labor and Statistics regularly publishes articles
on the significant consequence of automation for
the labour force in their journal Monthly Labor
Review  (Goodman 1996;  Plewes 1990).  This
work  suggests  that  greater  automatization  of
jobs may cause standard measures of productiv-
ity and output to increase, while still increasing
unemployment.
Similar interest in the economic and social
impacts  of  automatization is  evident  in many
other  countries.  For  instance,  Policy  Horizons
Canada is a think-tank that works for the Ca-
nadian government, which has published work
on the effects of increasing automatization and
the future of the economy (Arshad 2012). Soon
after  the  publication  of  our  recent  work  on
Spaun, I was contacted by this group to discuss
the impact of Spaun and related technologies. It
was  clear  from  our  discussion  that  machine
learning, automated control, robotics, and so on
are of great interest to those who have to plan
for  the  future,  namely  our  governments  and
policy makers (Padbury et al. 2014).
This is not surprising. A recent McKinsey
report  suggests  that  these  highly  disruptive
technologies  are  likely  to  have  an  economic
value of about $18 trillion by 2025 (Manyika et
al. 2013). It is also clear from the majority of
analyses, that lower-paid jobs will be the first
affected,  and that  the  benefits  will  accrue  to
those who can afford what will initially be ex-
pensive technologies. Every expectation, then, is
that automatization will exacerbate the already
large and growing divide between rich and poor
(Malone 2014;  “The Future of Jobs:  The On-
rushing Wave”  2014).  Being  armed  with  this
knowledge now means that individuals, govern-
ments, and corporations can support progessive
policies  to  mitigate  these  kinds  of  potentially
problematic  societal  shifts  (Padbury et  al.
2014).
Indeed, many of the benefits of automatiz-
ation  may  help  alleviate  the  potential  down-
sides. Automatization has already had signific-
ant  impact  on the growth of  new technology,
both  speeding  up  the  process  of  development
and making new technology cheaper.  The hu-
man genome project was a success largely be-
cause of the automatization of the sequencing
process. Similarly, many aspects of drug discov-
ery can be automatized by using advanced com-
putational techniques (Leung et al. 2013). Auto-
matization  of  more  intelligent  behaviour  than
simply generating and sifting  through data is
likely to have an even greater impact on the ad-
vancement of science and engineering. This may
lead more quickly  to cleaner  and cheaper  en-
ergy,  advances  in  manufacturing,  decreases  in
the  cost  and access  to  advanced technologies,
and other societal benefits.
As a consequence, manufacturing is likely
to become safer—a trend already seen in areas
of  manufacturing that  employ large numbers
of robots (Robertson et al. 2005). At the same
time,  additional  safety  considerations  come
into  play  as  robotic  and  human  workspaces
themselves begin to interact. This concern has
resulted in  a significant  focus in robotics  on
compliant robots. Compliant robots are those
that  have  “soft”  environmental  interactions,
often implemented by including real or virtual
springs on the robotic platform. As a result,
control  becomes  more  difficult,  but  interac-
tions  become  much  safer,  since  the  robotic
system does not rigidly go to a target position
even if there is an unexpected obstacle (e.g., a
person) in the way.
As  the  workplace  continues  to  become
one where human and automated systems co-
operate,  additional  concerns  may arise  as  to
what  kinds  of  human-machine  relationships
employers  should  be  permitted  to  demand.
Will  employees  have  the  right  not  to  work
with certain kinds of technology? Will employ-
ers still have to provide jobs to employees who
refuse  certain  work  situations?  These  ques-
tions  touch  on  many  of  the  same  subjects
highlighted in  the previous  section regarding
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the ethical challenges that will be raised as we
develop more and more sophisticated artificial
minds.
Finally, much has been made of the pos-
sibility that the automatization of technological
advancement  could  eventually  result  in  ma-
chines  designing  themselves  more  effectively
than humans can. This idea has captured the
public imagination, and the point in time where
this occurs is now broadly known as “The Sin-
gularity,” a term first introduced by von Neu-
mann (Ulam 1958). Given the vast  variety of
functions that machines are built to perform, it
seems highly  unlikely  that  there  will  be  any-
thing analogous to a mathematical singularity—
a  clearly  defined,  discontinuous  point—after
which machines will be superior to humans. As
with most things, such a shift, if  it occurs, is
likely to be gradual. Indeed, the earlier timeline
is one suggestion for how such a gradual shift
might  occur.  Machines  are  already  used  in
many aspects of design, for performing optimiz-
ations that would not be possible without them.
Machines are also already much better at many
functions than people: most obviously mechan-
ical functions, but more recently cognitive ones,
like playing chess and answering trivia questions
in certain circumstances.
Because  the  advancement  of  intelligent
machines is likely to continue to be a smooth,
continuous one (even if  exponential  at times),
we will likely remain in a position to make in-
formed decisions about what they are permitted
to do. As with members of a strictly human so-
ciety,  we  do  not  tolerate  arbitrary  behaviour
simply  because  such  behaviour  is  possible.  If
anything, we will be in a better position to spe-
cify appropriate behaviour in machines than we
are in the case of our human peers. Perhaps we
will need laws and other societal controls for de-
termining forbidden or tolerable behaviour. Per-
haps some people and machines will choose to
ignore those laws. But, as a society, it is likely
that  we  will  enforce  these  behavioural  con-
straints the same way we do now—with public-
ally sanctioned agencies that act on behalf  of
society. In short, the dystopian predictions we
often see that revolve around the development
of intelligent robots seem no more or less likely
because  of  the  robots.  Challenges  to  societal
stability are nothing new: war, hunger, poverty,
weather are constant destabilizing forces. Artifi-
cial minds are likely to introduce another force,
but one that may be just as likely to be stabiliz-
ing as problematic.
Unsurprisingly, like many other technolo-
gical  changes,  the  development  of  artificial
minds will bring with it both costs and benefits.
It may even be the case that deciding what is a
cost  and what is  a  benefit  is  not  straightfor-
ward. If indeed many jobs become automated, it
would  be  unsurprising  if  the  average  working
week becomes shorter. As a result, a large num-
ber of people may have much more recreational
time  than has  been  typical  in  recent  history.
This may seem like a clear benefit, as many of
us look forward to holidays and time off work.
However, it has been argued that fulfilling work
is  a  central  to  human  happiness  (Thagard
2010). Consequently,  overly limited or unchal-
lenging  work  may end  up  being  a  significant
cost of automation.
As  good  evidence  for  costs  and  benefits
becomes available, decision-makers will be faced
with the challenge of determining what the ap-
propriate  roles  of  artificial  minds  should  be.
These roles will no doubt evolve as technologies
change,  but  there  is  little  reason  to  presume
that  unmanageable  upheavals  or  “inflection
points” will be the result of artificial minds be-
ing developed. While we, as a society, must be
aware  of,  and prepared  for,  being  faced  with
new kinds of ethical dilemmas, this has been a
regular occurrence during the technological de-
velopments  of  the  last  several  hundred  years.
Perhaps  the  greatest  challenges  will  arise  be-
cause of the significant wealth imbalances that
may be exacerbated by limited access to more
intelligent machines.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that we are at a unique point in
the development of technologies that are critical
to the realization of artificial minds. I have even
gone so far as to predict that human-level intel-
ligence and physical ability will be achieved in
about fifty years. I suspect that for many famil-
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iar with the history of artificial intelligence such
predictions will be easily dismissed. Did we not
have such predictions over fifty years ago? Some
have suggested that  the singularity will  occur
by 2030 (Vinge 1993), others by 2045 (Kurzweil
2005).  There  were  suggestions  and  significant
financial speculation that AI would change the
world  economy  in  the  1990s,  but  this  never
happened. Why would we expect anything to be
different this time around?
In short, my answer is encapsulated by the
specific  technological,  theoretical,  and empirical
developments I  have described above.  I  believe
that they address the central limitations of previ-
ous approaches to artificial cognition, and are sig-
nificantly more mature than is generally appreci-
ated. In addition, the limitations they address—
such as power consumption, computational scal-
ing, control of nonlinear dynamics, and integrat-
ing large-scale neural systems—have been more
central to prior failures than many have realized.
Furthermore, the financial resources being direc-
ted  towards  the  challenge  of  building  artificial
minds is unprecedented. High-tech companies, in-
cluding Google, IBM, and Qualcomm have inves-
ted billions of dollars in machine intelligence. In
addition, funding agencies including DARPA (De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency), EU-
IST (European Union—Information Society Tech-
nologies),  IARPA  (Intelligence  Advanced  Re-
search Projects Agency), ONR (Office of Naval
Research), and AFOSR (Air Force Office of Sci-
entific  Research)  have  contributed  a  similar  or
greater amount of financial support across a wide
range of projects focused on brain-inspired com-
puting. And the two special billion dollar initiat-
ives from the US and EU will serve to further
deepen our understanding of biological cognition,
which has, and will continue, to inspire builders of
artificial minds.
While I believe that the alignment of these
forces will serve to underpin unprecedented ad-
vances in our understanding of biological cogni-
tion, there are several challenges to achieving the
timeline I suggest above. For one, robotic actuat-
ors are still far behind the efficiency and speeds
found in nature. There will no doubt be advances
in materials science that will help overcome these
limitations, but how long that will take is not yet
clear. Similarly, sensors on the scale and precision
of those available from nature are not yet avail-
able. This is less true for vision and audition, but
definitely the case for proprioception and touch.
The latter  are essential  for  fluid,  rapid motion
control. It also remains to be seen how well our
theoretical methods for integrating complex sys-
tems will scale. This will only become clear as we
attempt to construct more and more sophistic-
ated systems. This is perhaps the most fragile as-
pect of my prediction: expecting to solve difficult
algorithmic  and  integration  problems.  And,  of
course, there are myriad other possible ways in
which I may have underestimated the complexity
of biological cognition: maybe glial cells are per-
forming critical computations; maybe we need to
describe genetic transcription processes in detail
to capture learning; maybe we need to delve to
the  quantum level  to  get  the  explanations  we
need—but I am doubtful (Litt et al. 2006).
Perhaps  it  goes  without  saying  that,  all
things considered, I believe the timeline I propose
is a plausible one.1 This, of course, is predicated on
there being the societal and political will to allow
the development of artificial minds to proceed. No
doubt researchers in this field need to be respons-
ive to public concerns about the specific uses to
which such technology might be put. It will be im-
portant to remain open, self-critical, and self-regu-
lating as artificial minds become more and more
capable. We must usher in these technologies with
care,  fully  cogniscent  of,  and willing  to discuss,
both their costs and their benefits.
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